Integrated_Annual_Report_2026 - Flipbook - Page 151
INTRODUCTION
SASOL AT A
GLANCE
DRIVING SUSTAINABLE
VALUE CREATION
EXECUTING
STRATEGY
DELIVERING
BUSINESS VALUE
SUMMARISED FINANCIAL
PERFORMANCE
CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
REMUNERATION
REPORT
SUSTAINABILITY
REPORT
ASSURANCE /
ADMINISTRATION
REMUNERATION AT A GLANCE CONTINUED
Remuneration Policy summary
The following tables provide summarised information pertaining to the different pay components of our FY26 Remuneration Policy:
Component
FIXED
PAY AND
BENEFITS
Strategic intent/design principles
Minimum shareholding requirement (MSR) as a percentage of annual pensionable remuneration
• Attraction and retention of employees.
• Internal equity and external sector-competitiveness.
• Recognition of experience, competence and performance which informs
• President and CEO: 300%
• Group Chief Financial Officer: 200%
• Other Executive Directors and Prescribed Officers: 100%
a distribution around the market median.
• Benefits are designed to be geographically and role-appropriate. Employees
are expected to participate in private or state provided health insurance
plans which in some cases are enhanced through top-up plans. Health
insurance costs for lower level employees may be subsidised through
employer contributions.
• All our employees can participate in a retirement fund which may include
an employer contribution.
• Promote value creation through safe and sustainable performance informed
SHORT-TERM
INCENTIVES
(STI)1
Remuneration outcomes
skills and/or critical skills.
A post-cessation shareholding requirement of
18 months post service termination is in place. The
final MSR has to be retained for 12 months and 50%
thereof, for a further 6 months’ period after the
executive’s service has terminated.
FY26
A snapshot of pay decision outcomes which were taken by the Committee in terms of the approved FY26
Remuneration Policy, detailed further in the Implementation Report in Part III:
Component
by financial and non-financial key priorities measured at Group, Business Unit
and Individual levels.
• Fatality penalties are applied on short-term incentive outcomes for all eligible
participants.
• Alignment with shareholders’ long-term value creation.
• Attraction and retention of senior employees and employees with scarce
LONG-TERM
INCENTIVES
(LTI)1
Executive Directors have five years and Prescribed
Officers have six years from appointment to reach
the required minimum shareholding.
Vested LTIs have to be retained (after settlement
of taxes), and not sold, until the MSR is achieved.
Key Committee decisions
FY26
• Employees not included in collective bargaining units:
• The cost of annual salary increases (effective 1 October 2025) which includes market
adjustments where applicable reflects the cost discipline in the organisation. SA: 4,13%, US:
1,73%, Germany: 1,72%, Italy: 1,81%, Mozambique: 4,31%.
FIXED
PAY AND
BENEFITS
• Vesting conditions include a combination of performance and time-based
Details about market adjustments for members of the GEC are included on page 164
• Employees covered by collective bargaining/co-determination agreements:
- Increases in most jurisdictions are determined under multi-year agreements set over two
to three years
criteria to support longer-term decision making and support retention efforts.
• Minimum shareholding and post-cessation shareholding requirements
for Executive Directors and Prescribed Officers promote longer-term
decision making.
- SA: average⁵ 5,5%; Germany: 0%2; Italy: 0,86%; Mozambique: 5,6%. Implementation dates
vary according to agreements
• For senior leaders in Expertise, Leadership and Group Leadership roles (221 as at
30 June 2026), the final STI amount was calculated as follows:
Eligibility and frequency of payment/settlement
FIXED
PAY AND
BENEFITS
- TGP or Base Salary x Target Incentive % x (Group Score 80% + IPF3 20%) less
fatality penalty.
• All permanent and non-permanent employees are paid on a monthly basis
except in the USA where payments are made bi-weekly in line with market
practice.
• Benefit structures follow local market practice or statutory minimum
requirements.
SHORT-TERM
INCENTIVES1
• Subject to local market practice, permanent employees may be eligible to
SHORT-TERM
INCENTIVES1
in which employees are employed (out of a target of 100% and a maximum potential of
150%).
- The incentive plans for non-managerial employees resulted in final scores of
between 91,5% and 93,5%.
participate in a short-term incentive plan.
• Production bonus plans may be implemented where these enhance line
of sight.
• Annual awards are made for eligible employees in senior management and
LONG- TERM
INCENTIVES1
1
2
3
4
5
• For all other employees, the STI was calculated as follows4:
- TGP or Base Salary x Target Incentive % x Group STI% (less fatality penalty) x IPF3 %.
• The following percentages reflect the FY26 Group STI outcome:
- Members of the GEC: 89,5% (out of a target of 100% and maximum potential of 150%)
- Rest of participants between 89,5% and 93,5% depending on the role category and entity
leadership roles.
• Half-yearly awards may be made in cases of new appointments or
promotions to eligible role categories.
• Dividend equivalents are awarded at the vesting date(s) to the extent that
vesting conditions have been achieved and dividends have been declared.
• Executive Directors and Prescribed Officers:
- 50% of the FY24 Performance LTIs will vest in FY27 at 72%, (out of a target of 100% and
stretch target of 200%) based on performance against the CPTs over the period 1 July
2023 to 30 June 2026.
- The remaining 50% of the performance LTIs as well as the Restricted LTIs granted in
FY24, will vest in FY29 subject to continued employment vesting conditions. This is in
line with the approved FY24 Remuneration Policy.
- The LTIs that were previously subject to the delivery of 300MW of Renewable Energy by
31 December 2026, will vest in FY27 as this target has now been met.
LONG-TERM
INCENTIVES1
Malus and Clawback Policy and Executive Compensation Recovery Policy apply to all variable pay awards
Negotiated agreement to defer to FY27
IPF: Individual Performance Factor
Where market practice or workplace agreement excludes the usage of an IPF, the formula excludes such
Average across Mining, Chemicals and Petroleum bargaining sectors.
SASOL INTEGRATED REPORT 2026
150
